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A DIVIDED CONSCIENCE: THE LOST CONVICTIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS?
Tobias Kelly 
 Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh 
In press, Public Culture, September 2018. 
 
 
Abstract 
The category of conscience has played a key role in the history of human rights. 
However, since a high point in the decades after the Second World War, much of 
the human rights movement appears to have become less interested in the issue. 
Instead, claims of conscience have often become the domain of the religious 
right. This article asks how this has happened, and whether human rights –
widely accused of a retreat into technicalities at the expense of intense 
conviction - has lost anything along the way? In doing so, the article treats 
conscience as a historically embedded and contested category, exploring the 
types of subject claims of conscience conjure up, the forms of difference they can 
reproduce, and the conflicts they both create and mediate. The central argument 
of the paper is that the protection of conscience has often been discriminatory in 
terms of the types of person and forms of conviction that it seeks to promote. 
 
In January 2015 Amnesty International rejected a proposal to introduce a “conscience 
clause” into Northern Irish law.* The clause followed legal action against Ashers 
Baking Company – popularly known as the “gay cake case” - for refusing to make 
confectionary celebrating International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia. 
The bakers were being prosecuted for a breach of the Equality Act. In response, Paul 
Givan, an elected member of the ruling Democratic Unionist Party, proposed an 
amendment, arguing that it was necessary to “stop the civil persecution of people of 
faith… (and)… uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”1  The 
amendment would have created a reservation for people who objected to providing 
services they felt endorsed “behavior or beliefs which conflict with the strongly held 
religious convictions”.2  
The Northern Ireland “conscience clause” fitted into a wider trend of 
attempted legislation and litigation, particularly in the US, claiming to protect 
people’s deeply held beliefs and convictions. Unsurprisingly, such legal moves have 
met with considerable protest, not least from human rights groups, who have accused 
proponents of trying to create a two-tier system of justice. Although Givan was 
claiming to speak in the name of human rights, Amnesty International condemned the 
amendment as a “recipe for a significant reduction in rights protection”.3 At a protest 
in Belfast, Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty UK’s program director for Northern Ireland 
declared, “this is not a conscience clause, it is a discrimination clause… I say to those 
behind this law: if the code by which you live your life tells you that it is OK to treat 
                                                        
* The research upon which this paper was based was generously funded by an ERC Horizon 2020 
Consolidator Grant (648477 AnCon  ERC-2014-CoG). I would like to thank Harini Amarasuriya, 
Nehal Bhuta, Matei Candea, Jennifer Curtis, Farzana Haniffa, akshay khanna, Sindharthan 
Muanaguru, Galina Oustinova-Stjepanovic, Jonathan Spencer, Mathias Thaler, Deepika Udagama, and 
the participants at seminars at the Open University of Sri Lanka and Cambridge University, for their 
insightful comments. I am particularly grateful for the typically thoughtful feedback from the late and 
much missed Vijay Nagaraj. 
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some people as inferior, then you need to take a good, hard look at yourself. Your 
moral compass is broken”.4  
 
Conscience has played a central role in the history of modern human rights. The 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights put issues of conscience up front and center, 
mentioning the word no less that three times, including in the Preamble and very first 
article. The significance of conscience was also hardwired into Amnesty 
International’s original mission, as it rose to prominence as an organization devoted 
to protecting Prisoners of Conscience. For much of the mid-twentieth century 
international human rights movement, conscience was both the driving motivation of 
human rights work, and the thing they sought to protect, sometimes even being seen 
as the foundational human right (Jellinek 2009; Moyn 2015). Yet, over the following 
sixty years, much of the movement appears to have become significantly less 
interested in the issue. Instead, conscience has often become the specific domain of 
the religious right, amongst others. Part of the reason for the relative loss of focus 
might be that conscience has simply been crowded out, as social and economic rights 
in particular, have been given an increasing prominence. The question remains 
though, given its foundational status, how has conscience been so easily put to one 
side? And what has been lost, if anything, along the way? 
 
The aim of this article is to show how the protection of conscience went from being 
at the center of the international human rights project, to holding a relatively marginal 
position. The article treats conscience as a historically embedded and contested 
category, rather than a transcendent principle or experience. The objective is to 
examine the shifting political and cultural work that the use of the category has done, 
rather than come up with a definition. This is not to say that there is no such thing as 
conscience. Instead, it is to examine the changing tensions involved in particular 
politically and culturally situated claims. Doing so enables us to ask what types of 
action, and by whom, has a focus on conscience made possible? This means 
exploring the types of subject claims of conscience conjure up, the forms of 
difference they can reproduce, and the conflicts they both create and mediate. 
Within human rights work, the category of conscience has implicitly served as 
a cross-cultural category marking the universal human capacity to make moral 
judgments.  In this sense it is both used descriptively and prescriptively, stating what 
humans are already and what they should be. Speaking more broadly, in popular 
culture, philosophy and law, conscience is the faculty - however troubled - that is 
supposed to help us stand up to domination, make decisions of life and death, and 
motivate people to do good in the world (Clark 2001; Mandelstam 1999; McEwan 
2014; Press 2014). Liberal philosophy, in particular, has seen conscience as a deep 
and inclusive principle, speaking directly to what it means to be human (Dworkin 
1995; Rawls 1993, Walzer 1970). Conscience, from this perspective, is central to the 
constitution of the ‘modern subject’ (Taylor 1989). For its critics though, a 
valorization of conscience presents a particularly narrow vision, rooted in specific 
Christian traditions (Laborde 2012). As with human right more generally, it has been 
argued that a focus on conscience has its roots in Christian thought and practice 
(Evans 2015; Hopgood 2013, Moyn 2015; Perry 1998). Protecting conscience 
therefore allows distinctly Christian forms of conviction to trump all other concerns. 
Far from being the basis on a universal form of human freedom, conscience is a 
narrow and discriminatory form of personhood that effectively marginalizes other 
political and religious projects (Fernando 2010). As such, the virtue of conscience is 
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far from self-evident. If conscience is central to the ‘modern subject’ this is a subject 
that is divided and exclusionary. 
From the perspective of twentieth century human rights, conscience is an 
issue of conviction. These are convictions that may, or may not be religious or 
secular, but they are seen as deeply held and going to the heart of the ways in which 
individuals are understood to give meaning to their worlds. However, as Alberto 
Toscano has argued, there is a central uncertainty running through much liberal 
politics – in which we can include much human rights - over how to deal with 
conviction (2010; Critchley 2007). Should it be seen as a fanatical form of 
commitment, or an antidote to anemic civil apathy? We might similarly ask, is 
conscience about the exercise of moral autonomy, or the blind commitments of a 
zealot? What forms of conscience should we therefore listen to and what types should 
we ignore? Any attempt to protect conscience is therefore an attempt to define the 
forms of conviction that are seen as having a legitimate place in public life (Connelly 
1999; Mahmood 2006). The ways in which different forms of conviction have been 
legitimized and regulated has shaped the concerns of human rights practitioners and 
their approaches to conscience. 
Human rights have been criticized by failing to provide a positive vision of 
humanity by promoting a hollow “most we can hope for” humanism, that focuses on 
suffering rather than potential human flourishing (Brown 2004; Hopgood 2013; 
Moyn 2015). There have also been widespread claims that twenty-first century 
human rights have lost their moral energy in a retreat into technical managerialism 
(Douzinas 2000, Hopgood 2013). As Samuel Moyn has argued, for example, human 
rights has been guilty of “prizing moderation against extremes over liberation of 
human capacity” and therefore might look to religion, amongst other places, to 
reclaim inspiration (2015). More broadly, Simon Critchley has pointed to what he 
calls “a motivation deficit at the heart of secular liberal democracy” (2007, 7). In this 
context, examining conscience can help provide an alternative perspective on the 
international human rights movement - one that emphasizes convictions about the 
human potential for doing good in the world.  
The central argument of this paper is that the attempts by the international 
human rights movement to protect conscience have always been deeply ambiguous 
and discriminatory. Much of this human rights work has been marked by an 
understanding of conscience shaped as a particular response to the totalitarian 
regimes of the mid-twentieth century, which sits awkwardly in relation to the 
struggles over anti-colonialism, race and gender that marked the latter part of the 
century. As such, it is not simply that protecting conscience can free people to act in 
discriminatory ways – although it can do that too – but rather that the protection of 
conscience is itself discriminatory in terms of the types of person and forms of 
conviction that it singles out. We could tell the story of the rise and fall of conscience 
within international human rights as a story of the relative position of particular 
Christian networks and organizations within the human rights field (see, for example 
Duranti 2016; Lindqvist 2013; Moyn 2015). This is obviously part of the story. But 
the tensions between the nominally religious and secular is of potentially less 
significance than their common hierarchical assumption about what it means to be 
human.  Tather than lament the relative decline of enthusiasm for claims of 
conscience as a loss of liberal nerve or a failure of conviction, conscience should 
itself be seen as a right that is always liable to be captured by existing forms of 
inequality.  It is not that the Christian right has subverted the human right to freedom 
of conscience, but rather that they are working in a much longer exclusionary 
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tradition that has been central to the conscience of human rights practice.  
 
The following pages provide an account of the rise and fall of claims of conscience in 
the international human rights movement. The paper begins though with a broader 
discussion of the role of conscience in attempts to regulate legitimate and appropriate 
forms of conviction. It next moves on to focus on the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, examining the tensions between conscience as the motivating force of 
human rights work, and conscience as the object to be protected, between conscience 
as a form of obligation, and conscience as a form of freedom. The bulk of the paper 
then focuses on how these tensions played out in the history Amnesty International 
and its arguments over the relationship between conscience, nonviolence and 
sexuality. Amnesty should not be taken as representing the international human rights 
movement its entirety, but rather, as an organization that exemplifies many of they 
tensions in the category of conscience from the perspective of human rights.  
 
What Is This Thing Called Conscience? 
Debates over freedom of conscience have a history that is longer and wider than 
human rights, and liberalism, for that matter. Even within these histories though, it is 
important to note that there is nothing self-evident about the importance placed on 
conscience, or the forms it is thought to take. Historically, conscience has been 
understood variously as an innate quality of all humans, a gift from God reserved for 
a privileged few, the product of self-deception, or simply morally insignificant; it can 
be seen as a feeling, a thought, or an intuition, amongst other things (Andrew 2001; 
Baylor 1977).  The Protestant Reformation saw a partial challenge to a tradition that 
saw conscience as obligation with an objective basis in the word of God and 
teachings of the Church (Andrew 2001). This saw a view of conscience as an internal 
form of moral reflection focused on a self-centered agent. Conscience in this form - 
often associated in its most extreme manifestations with Quakerism - was potentially 
revolutionary in that it recognized no external authority or particular content other 
than the sincere convictions of the believer (Walzer 1982). It was therefore not only 
individual but profoundly subjective and free. The tension between conscience as 
conservative or radical, as a matter of obligation or an issue of freedom, would 
continue to run through the human rights struggles of the twentieth century.  
If the claim that we have a conscience and the forms that it said to take is 
embedded in specific histories, so too are the issues upon which conscience is 
thought to focus. For eighteenth century protestant dissenters, for example, the taking 
of oaths was a key issue (Andrew 2001). In nineteenth century Britain, conscience 
was widely associated with opposition to compulsory vaccination (Durbach 2001). 
For twentieth century pacifists, conscience was primarily about war and killing. The 
modern human rights movement saw conscience as linked to political prisoners. And 
for twenty first century conservative Christians, sexuality was the main concern. 
Whatever its focus, one of the key things that a claim of conscience does, in liberal 
regimes in particular, is try to address political questions by referring to internal 
convictions (Brown 2015; khanna 2016). Debates about the distribution of rights and 
obligations are answered through reference to the interior state of individuals 
(Muehlebach 2012). By treating politics as an issue to be dealt with at the level of 
personal interiority, hard to solve questions are placed into the black box called 
“conscience”.  
But a focus on conscience as an issue of internal and individual scruple, also 
creates its own problems. One of the key implications of an individual, interior and 
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radically free understanding of conscience is that we have little or no criteria to 
choose between different claims. Moral autonomy can also imply the autonomy to be 
amoral, immoral, and even mistaken. Even those who have historically prioritized 
conscience have worried about it being misleading (see, for example, Locke 1689: 
60; 1695: 254). A radically free and individualistic conscience can take us in 
problematic directions. 
But, it is not just that conscience can lead us to both virtues and vices, but 
equally importantly, that it can be hard to know what conscience looks like when we 
come across it. Nihilism, self-interest, and apathy can appear indistinguishable from 
sincere conviction. As Hannah Arendt argued, for conscience to be socially 
persuasive, it must be taken out of the internal life of an individual and brought into 
the world of public representations and debate (1972). There is therefore a double 
move: political conflicts are made into matters of individual internal conflict, and 
then they must be made social again in order to be recognized.  
Two things are important to note here. The first is that the often repeated 
distinction between conscience as a matter of internal individual belief, on the one 
hand, and the public manifestation of religion, on the other, becomes more complex 
(see for example, Asad 1993; Evans 1997; Fernando 2010). An individual conscience 
has no social significance unless someway is found to make it manifest to others.  
Conscience, like language, is never entirely private.  
And second, the distinction between a radically free subjective conscience 
and a more conservative doctrinal conscience focused on obligations, also begins to 
break down. This is because in the process of public recognition – as claims of 
conscience are acknowledged as legitimate - conscience becomes regulated. As 
commentators have remarked in relation to freedom of religion, attempts to protect 
religious freedom are never neutral (Sullivan 2006). For Winifred Sullivan, for 
example, the legal protection of religious freedom is impossible, as it constantly tries 
to draw a line around what counts as religion and therefore restricts what can be free 
(2006). As Sullivan argues, “to define is to exclude, and to exclude is to 
discriminate” (2006, 101). Something similar can be said about freedom of 
conscience. The acknowledgement of freedom of conscience puts in place limits on 
what and whom can be protected. Freedom of conscience has therefore historically 
been tightly circumscribed (Feldman 2002; Sandel 1989).  Protecting conscience can 
become a form of prejudicial intolerance, as only some forms of conscience are seen 
as having a legitimate place in public life.  
This paper will now turn to how these processes have played out in the field 
of international human rights, first in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and then at Amnesty International. 
 
The Conscience of Human Rights 
Conscience runs through the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the 
Preamble, the Declaration states that “contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.” And again, in its 
very first article, the UDHR claims that all human beings are “endowed with reason 
and conscience.” To be human in this vision is to have a conscience. To make matters 
doubly sure, the Declaration goes onto claim in article 18 that “everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” The Declaration can be seen as an 
attempt to make conscience a category resonating on a global and universal scale. In 
ways familiar from other attempts to codify human rights concerns, the meaning of 
conscience had to be seemingly lifted out of specific traditions and made to speak in 
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more abstract and general terms. In doing so though, the drafters were also 
necessarily speaking from a very particular historical perspective. 
For the committee members who wrote the Universal Declaration, reference 
to conscience can be seen to serve two overlapping functions. The first was to index 
the moral failures leading to the atrocities of the Second World War. For the French 
jurist and Nobel prize winner Rene Cassin, during the Second World War the 
“fundamental principles of mankind had been forgotten.”5 Geoffrey Wilson, the 
British delegate and Quaker, who would later become chair of Oxfam, similarly 
argued “the basic idea was to explain in an International instrument that the 
conscience of mankind had been shocked by inhuman acts in Nazi Germany.”6 If 
more people had acted according to their consciences, so the logic seemed to go, the 
Holocaust would not have happened. Auschwitz was seen as a unique failure of 
conscience, and the UDHR was a wake up call. We might note that viewing the 
horrors of the Second World War as the first failure of European humanism might 
seem as a parochial perspective, when viewed from the Congo, South West Africa, or 
Australasia, for example. As Wole Soyinka put it the ‘failure of European conscience 
can be placed centuries earlier, and that would be at the very inception of the Atlantic 
slave trade’ (1998, 38). Either way, from the perspective of the UDHR, to act 
according to conscience is to do good in the world in the wake of the destruction of 
the previous decade. 
The references to conscience in the Declation were doing more than that 
marking a historical rupture. Some of the drafters were also deliberately indexing a 
very particular type of conscience - a Christian conscience.  As Nehal Bhuta has 
argued, for prominent figures behind the Declaration, the text was an attempt to 
harness Christian faith as a “bulwark against anti-democratic, materialist, and 
totalitarian propensities” (2014, 11). Similarly, Sam Moyn has claimed that Charles 
Malik - the Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christian who served on the drafting 
committee - was implicitly invoking the Thomist formula of “reason and conscience” 
(2015; see also Lindqvist 2013, 436). For Malik and Cassin, conscience as part of the 
spiritual dimension of humanity, which would be essential in defeating 
totalitarianism. Such approaches to conscience did not go unchallenged though. The 
Brazilian delegation worried that history showed not all people had a conscience, and 
therefore it was an unstable foundation on which to base a claim of universal rights.7 
We might also add that many fascists presumably thought that they were following 
their consciences too- however warped (Koonz 2003). Either way, this was an early 
indication within the human rights movement that conscience did not always sit 
easily alongside a universal and inclusive sense of human moral virtue.  
The final version of Article 18 of the UDHR read, “everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” There was some ambiguity though as 
to whether conscience was distinct from religion, or qualified the type of religion that 
was protected. Pen Chun Chang, the Chinese delegate – a Confucian philosopher and 
former student of John Dewey - thought that religion was a specific example of 
conscience and thought. Whilst the Chilean delegate argued “even political beliefs 
could be included.”8 However, an early UK draft stated that, “everyone shall be free 
to hold any religious or other belief dictated by his conscience and to change his 
belief”.9 The implication was that conscience was foundational for religion, and more 
significantly, distinguished the form of religion that was to be protected.10 Article 18 
of the UDHR also has to be seen against the broader context of a move away from on 
the collective rights of religious minorities, towards one that emphasized the rights of 
individual believers (Asad 1993; Evans 1997; Mahmood 2015). Whether seen as 
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“religious” or otherwise, a central part of the vision of conscience promoted by the 
UDHR was one of individual belief and conviction. 
Crucially though, the UDHR’s implicit promotion of an internal conscience 
raises more questions than it answers. On the one hand conscience, it was implied, 
was free, and therefore “conscience” is “conscience”, whatever form its convictions 
take, democratic or authoritarian, religious or secular. It is this very openness and 
freedom that needs to be protected. This is the type of conscience that we might read 
as being promoted in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration. The promotion of such 
a relatively free form of conscience might explain why Article 18 also stated that 
people had the right to change their religion. At the same time, this emphasis on 
freedom also means that people with problematic convictions can make claims of 
conscience. And this goes against the spirit of conscience in the Preamble and Article 
1 of the Declaration, where conscience is about the obligation to “do the right thing”. 
Furthermore, the provision that people have the right to change religion also 
simultaneously points to the relatively lack of freedom of conscience. It is implicitly 
assumed that conscience takes religious form, and that religion is of a form that 
prioritizes choice and belief. Not all claims conscience are therefore seen as being 
equal in the UDHR. None of this is a problem so long as the people who make claims 
of conscience are the “correct” sort of people. The human rights movement did not 
have to face the tension between conscience as freedom and conscience as obligation, 
between expansive and exclusionary approaches to conscience, so long as people 
making claims of conscience chimed with the spirit of their own. This would not 
always be the case. 
 
The Conscience of Amnesty International 
In the decades after the Universal Declaration, Amnesty International was the 
organization that directly took on the human rights concern with conscience. And, in 
its campaign to free Prisoners of Conscience, which started in 1961, Amnesty would 
try and give conscience a positive form.  
Eric Baker, a British Quaker, pacifist and Secretary General of the National 
Peace Council, was the person who was probably most influential in shaping the 
ways in which Amnesty understood conscience in its early years. In doing so he drew 
on his own experience as a conscientious objector during the Second World War. 
Initially, Baker had been directed to carry out agricultural work, but won his appeal 
on the grounds that his conscience meant he would not take any compulsion.11 His 
experience was fairly typical for many British Quakers (Kelly 2015). Of all the 
people claiming exemption from military service, white, male middle class protestant 
dissenters had the relatively easiest time in persuading the tribunal that their 
conscience was sincere and appropriate. Quaker conscience was individual and 
subjective, but it as also loyal and patriotic (Kelly 2015). This was the form of 
conscience most readily acknowledged by the British state - as opposed to the claims 
of anarchists, socialists, and Jehovah Witnesses, for example. It was also a version of 
conscience that would dominate the early years of Amnesty. 
In its first decade there was a strong Christian emphasis at Amnesty 
(Hopgood 2006). Alongside the Quaker Eric Baker, Peter Benenson, the man widely 
seen as the founder of Amnesty, was a deeply committed Catholic convert. Both of 
them saw religion as central to Amnesty’s mission. Amnesty’s first five annual 
reports, for example, had the subtitle: “an international movement for freedom of 
opinion and religion.”12 And of the eight original members of the board of trustees, 
three were reverends.13 Many of the early individual letters sent out by Baker and 
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Benenson also went out to churches, and included a suggested “prayer for human 
rights day.”14 Importantly, Benenson in particular, saw the Amnesty campaign as an 
attempt at spiritual transformation (Buchanan 2002). Conscience here was not just 
something that needed protecting, but was also part of the motivation for human 
rights work - speaking directly to the ways in which conscience was understood by 
Malik and Cassin in the drafting of the UDHR. 
Baker would draw on particular Quaker notions of conscience in shaping the 
ways in which Amnesty approached their work. Again this was an individual and free 
conscience that walked within tight lines, particularly in relation to the use of 
violence. Benenson had originally wanted to focus on “political prisoners”. It was 
Baker who suggested framing the issue in terms of conscience.15 The 1961 article in 
the Observer newspaper that launched Amnesty defined Prisoners of Conscience as 
“Any person who is physically restrained (by imprisonment or otherwise) from 
expressing (in any form of words or symbols) any opinion which he honestly holds 
and which does not advocate or condone personal violence.”16  
The question remained as to what or whom counted as a Prisoner of 
Conscience? One of Amnesty’s earliest publications contains a series of short essays 
telling the story of people who have “suffered” for their “ideals” (Amnesty 1961, 9). 
These included Ashton Jones, a white clergyman and civil rights activists arrested for 
eating in a “colored restaurant” in the southern United States; and Patrick Duncan, a 
South African disabled, white, anti-apartheid activist; and Constantin Noica, an 
Eastern Orthodox Christian and philosopher, detained in Communist Romania. Of the 
nine people, eight were men, and their numbers included clergy, academics, lawyers, 
and writers. These were forms of conscience where would have been very familiar to 
liberal and devout figures such as Baker and Benenson. 
Formally, Amnesty’s stress was on “non-conformist” opinion or religion, and 
on the fact of imprisonment for a belief, rather than a particular belief. This was a 
deliberate attempt to “depoliticize” the appeal.  By dealing with detention as a matter 
of the suppression of individual conviction on a case-by-case basis, the structural 
conditions of imprisonment were self-consciously left to one side.  Amnesty would 
also develop what was called the “rule of three”, whereby it would adopt prisoners 
from the Communist block, the West and non-aligned countries in equal measure. 
Amnesty was therefore part of the tradition that tried to promote freedom of 
conscience as neutral and value free.17 But in practice it also, initially at least, 
restricted the forms of conscience that it tried to protect. The conscience of a 
relatively narrow type of person seemed easiest to recognize. 
 
Nonviolence was central to the ways in which Quaker pacifists such as Baker 
understood conscience. However, we should not treat the link between conscience 
and pacifism within human rights as self-evident. The Universal Declaration is 
decidedly not a pacifist document, and throughout the twentieth century, human 
rights would often be used to justify violence (see Perugini and Gordon 2015). There 
was also always internal skepticism on the moral virtue of nonviolence within 
Amnesty. As the publisher and early supporter Victor Gollancz wrote in a letter 
“though a complete pacifist… I deprecate your “Exclusion of those who condone or 
advocate… violence”. Do you really believe that those miserable prisoners in 
Spandau should continue to smolder there?”18 Alongside the pacifist wing, there was 
also a tradition of political realism within Amnesty, perhaps best represented by the 
figure of Sean McBride, former Chief of Staff of the IRA, Irish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and Chair of AI throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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The nonviolence stipulation was under pressure throughout the 1960s, 
particularly in relation to anti-colonial struggles. Nelson Mandel was famously 
rejected as a Prisoner of Conscience by Amnesty after he advocated the use of limited 
force in the fight against apartheid. Amnesty’s decision was unsurprisingly 
controversial. This was particularly the case as some of the senior members of 
Amnesty were also active in the Anti-Apartheid Movement.19 Critics argued that it 
was deeply problematic to disown people fighting for liberation from a 
discriminatory and violent system. However, a 1965 report from Amnesty on South 
Africa, the year after Mandela was imprisoned, noted “Amnesty … is not composed 
of philosophical anarchists who advance the view that society is obliged to tolerate 
any form of dissenting behaviour.”20 After polling all national sections, it was 
decided to restrict Amnesty’s work for Mandela to issues of prison conditions and 
fair trial.21 Benenson would later see this as a key turning point, as it was the first 
time that Amnesty had agreed to take up wider prison conditions, rather than focus 
solely on the release of Prisoners of Conscience.22 Although Amnesty would continue 
to campaign for people who had been “imprisoned for their conscientious opposition 
to apartheid, rather than about those who might be termed victims of apartheid”, a 
restricted conscience was beginning to creak around the edges.23 
The nonviolence clause was also acing pressures from other directions. There 
was a controversy over whether Communists could be Prisoners of Conscience, as 
“all Communist wanted the overthrow of the capitalist state by violence”.24 Benenson 
was particularly hostile to Communists, once writing to the British Foreign Office, 
for example, that Amnesty supported the attempt to limit their influence in Southern 
Africa.25 More generally, it was argued that retaining the nonviolence clause should 
not be seen as necessary support for pacifism, but rather as a way of marking out a 
politically neutral space (Thompson 2008, 328). 26 A leaflet explained: “membership 
could not agree” in which situations the use of violence could be justified.27  
But, even if the nonviolence clause was retained, it was still never a simple 
matter in deciding whether specific individuals were Prisoners of Conscience 
(Kaufman 1991). A Borderline Committee was therefore established to look at 
troublesome cases. British anti-Nuclear protestors who damaged property were 
rejected, as were peace activists who sprayed the slogan “hit back, protect 
yourself”.28 A Neo-Nazi imprisoned in the Federal Republic of Germany was also 
rejected on the grounds that he was inciting “discrimination and hostility”, and to be 
a Nazi was by definition to advocate violence.29 
 
A crucially important expansion of the definition of Prisoners of Conscience came in 
1968, when the first attempt was made to produce a formal constitution for 
Amnesty.30 At the Stockholm meeting of the International Council, Prisoners of 
Conscience were newly defined as persons who are imprisoned due to their “political, 
religious and other conscientiously held beliefs or because of their ethnic origin, 
colour or language” [emphasis added].31 The change took place despite an objection 
from some country sections that Amnesty should not campaign for victims of racial 
discrimination.32 The addition of ethnic origin and color should be seen in the context 
of the concerns about South Africa and anticolonial struggles more generally raised 
in the debate over Mandela. These changes would have long-term implications. Over 
the following decade the definition of Prisoners of Conscience would be further 
extended to include other attributes, such as sex and economic status, for example. 
One way of interpreting this shift is as a move away from a concern with Prisoners of 
Conscience because of restraints on their convictions, to a concern resulting from 
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discrimination. The anti-authoritarian, individualist and nonviolent conscience of 
Amnesty’s first decades found it difficult to respond to the collective struggles of the 
second half of the twentieth century. As we shall see below though, it was sexuality 
that would provide perhaps the biggest challenges. 
 
Sexuality and Conscience 
In 1979 Amnesty recognized that the persecution of a person for their homosexuality 
is a violation of their fundamental rights.33 However, the acknowledgment of 
sexuality as a specific issue of conscience was a slower process. It was only in 1991, 
after 15 years of lobbying from some members, that Amnesty agreed to include 
lesbians and gay men as Prisoners of Conscience (Hagland 1997). There had long 
been widespread opposition to directly broadening the Mandate - the official 
declaration of Amnesty’s aims and objectives. The main arguments were that 
advocating for homosexuals was an “unpopular” issue, that it would inhibit the 
develop of Amnesty International, and that it might lead to pressures to support 
“unacceptable sexual behavior.”34 In contrast, some sections had been arguing since 
the late 1970s that sexuality was similar to religion, race or ethnic origin and that 
sexuality was as “much a part of their nature as the colour of their skin.” 35 In part this 
can bee seen as an attempt to see conscience as a form of obligation rather then 
freedom. Sexuality was understood here as biologically determined and therefore not 
an issue of free will. In this line of argument, people were seen as having no choice 
over their sexuality.  
The question of the relationship between Prisoners of Conscience and 
sexuality was eventually referred to the Mandate Committee. 36  Prior to 1991 
Prisoners of Conscience could be adopted if they were imprisoned for advocating 
homosexual equality, or falsely accused for political reasons of being gay, but not if 
they were imprisoned for actually being gay. In the end a compromise was reached, 
whereby the Mandate was not changed, but it was agreed that the existing Mandate 
could be interpreted to allow Amnesty International to work for people “imprisoned 
solely because of their homosexuality, including the practice of homosexual acts 
between consenting adults.”37 This was justified by arguing that, in a creative 
stretching of everyday usage, the prior expansion to include people imprisoned on 
grounds of their sex could also cover those imprisoned for their sexuality. 38 In 
supporting the decision, explicit mention was made of anti-discrimination articles in 
the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.39  This was 
part of a gradual and still incomplete move towards equality rather than freedom 
being a key human rights issue. 
The first ever mission to investigate imprisoned homosexuals took place in 
the Isle of Man in February 1991. Unsurprisingly though, deciding which cases to 
take on was never straightforward. A British case of men jailed for masochist 
activities was rejected, for example, on the grounds that they were not imprisoned 
solely because of their sexuality, but also due to their use of violence.40 
 
Amnesty’s change of perspective on sexuality and conscience should be seen as part 
of a broader mainstreaming of sexuality issues across international human rights 
NGOs in the 1990s (Mertus 2007; Waites 2009). Prior to this period there were 
remarkably few direct mentions of sexuality in human rights documents. Northern 
Ireland though would play a crucial role in this history. In the early 1970s the Belfast 
gay rights activist Jeff Dudgeon had won a case before the European Court of Human 
Rights over the banning of homosexuality.41 Interestingly in its argument against 
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decriminalizing sodomy, the UK government argued that the people of Northern 
Ireland held “strong conscientious” opinions on sexuality.42 The court ruled though 
that the criminalization of homosexual acts between consenting adults was a violation 
of the right to a private and family life. The case was one of the first times an 
international body had recognized the connection between gay rights and universal 
human rights, and has since been used in litigation around the world (khanna 2016; 
Curtis 2014, 198). It was only in 2006 though that the Yogyakarta Principles would 
define sexual orientation as “integral to a person’s dignity and humanity” (O’Flaherty 
and Fisher 2008). The Principles represented a partial shift away from the language 
of civil and political rights that had marked movements such as Stonewall and the 
Gay Liberation Front, towards a focus on sexuality as an issue of social and 
economic rights. The phrase “sexual orientation” was included in the Principles after 
lobbying from some groups in the Global South, as a way of pushing against a 
narrower framing Eurocentric framing of LGBT rights.43 Sexuality, like conscience, 
was now recognized by the international human rights movement as an essential part 
of a person’s humanity (khanna 2016). And equally importantly, it was something 
that was said to be found deep within a person, much like the convictions of 
conscience. 
 
Amnesty’s expansion of the definition of Prisoners of Conscience should also be seen 
as part of the wider struggle to expand the Mandate. It became clear to many in the 
movement that focusing on specific prisoners, but not to protest the death penalty, 
disappearances, or torture, for example, seemed somewhat arbitrary (Hopgood 2006, 
Clark 2001). By 1991, the Mandate Review Committee was arguing that “freedom of 
conscience/expression has to be understood in the wide sense of the freedoms 
required to act in public.”44  
At the same 1991 meeting where sexuality was newly included in the working 
definition of Prisoners of Conscience, economic and social rights were also discussed 
seriously for the first time. According to Stephen Hopgood, the debate over 
conscience and sexuality became the trigger for a much larger discussion on the focus 
of movement (2006, 120). In 1995 Amnesty started working for political prisoners 
who were not prisoners of conscience.45 In 1997 Amnesty took a decision to 
“reaffirm” that it was determined to promote all human rights. In particular, it 
decided to “further intensify its work on social, economic and cultural rights.”46 The 
Mandate was eventually dropped altogether in 2002, in favor of a broader mission 
statement linking Amnesty’s objectives to the full range of rights contained in the 
UDHR. By the start of the twenty-first century, Prisoners of Conscience had dropped 
down the list of Amnesty’s central concerns, being largely superseded by the wider 
“Individuals at Risk” work, and at the time of writing is not listed on its website 
alongside the 15 central areas upon which they work. The conscientious concerns of 
Amnesty had expanded into a far wider range of human rights issues. 
 
Discriminating Cakes 
Let us now return to the cake with which we started. The case against Ashers Bakers 
has to be seen against a long history of struggles for gay rights in Northern Ireland. In 
the run up to the decriminalization of homosexuality, the Rev. Ian Paisley had led the 
Save Ulster from Sodomy Campaign throughout the late 1970s. Paisley later became 
Democratic Unionist First Minister of Northern Ireland under the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement. However, following the Northern Ireland Peace Process, sexuality was 
included as a protected characteristic in relation to anti-discrimination legislation 
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(Curtis 2014). Sexual equality was therefore effectively written into the constitutional 
settlement of Northern Ireland.47 In this context, gay rights activists also took part in 
a broader project of public visibility, seen most notably in Pride marches. Yet, 
although civil partnerships became legal in 2004, attempts to introduce same sex 
marriage have been rejected four times by the devolved assembly.  
Paul Givan, who proposed the conscience clause, was a member of Paisley’s 
protestant Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Importantly though, his proposed 
amendment received cross-denominational support. The Catholic Church in Northern 
Ireland said that it backed the general objective of the bill, and the Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland called for “reasonable accommodation in matters of conscience.”48 
It appeared to be going nowhere however, when Sinn Fein announced that under the 
power sharing arrangements in place as a result of the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process, it would block the law for failing to have cross community support.49 
In court, Ashers Bakers claimed that making the cake would “conflict with 
freedom of conscience”.50 The Northern Ireland Attorney General – a DUP member - 
intervened supporting the family, saying the actions of the Equality Commission 
amounted to a form of “cruelty” and “coerced expression”.51 In response Mr. Lee – 
the man who had ordered the original cake - told the court that the refusal had “made 
me feel like a second class citizen.” The Belfast judges ruled that the refusal to make 
the cake was a form of unlawful discrimination.52 £500 damages were agreed 
between the parties. The decision also confirmed that freedom of religion and 
conscience protection did not apply to commercial businesses such as Ashers. The 
usual argument put forward in such cases is two fold. First, in a free market, 
commercial businesses should not discriminate amongst customers. Second, 
conscience is an attribute of real person, not legal fictions such as companies. This 
argument though has recently been challenged in the US, where the Supreme Court 
famously ruled that private companies have a right to freedom of religion (Burwell 
vs. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc). 
Givan called the Belfast court’s decision an attack on “religious conviction”: 
“today there’s a clear hierarchy being established that gay rights are more important 
that the rights of people to hold religious beliefs.”  Interestingly sexuality and 
religious faith were being implicitly compared as similar categories. An appeal 
against the initial decision was rejected in October 2016. Amnesty International 
simply said that “No surprise in the Ashers case: unlawful discrimination.” 53 
However, support for Ashers came from perhaps unexpected quarters. Jeff Dudgeon, 
the veteran gay rights activist who had been central to the decriminalization of 
homosexuality, said: “I am nervous of gay zealotry, or any type of zealotry against 
Christians. It is a sort of triumphalism of people who were previously marginalised. 
There has been a lot of court activity, street preachers being charged with incitement. 
I think things have gone too far in that direction.”54  
 
Although the link between sexuality and conscience is far from self-evident, Northern 
Ireland is not alone in seeing the link being made. In Washington State, for example, 
florists have refused to provide flowers for gay weddings, and in New Mexico a 
photographer declined to shoot a same sex-commitment ceremony, both resulting in 
legal action. The right to decline making cakes celebrating same sex marriage has 
also gone all the way to the US Supreme Court.55 In both the US and the UK 
marriage registrars have refused to officiate at same sex weddings and civil 
ceremonies. Kentucky registrar Kim Davis, a born again Apostolic Christian, was 
sent to prison for six days for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples. 
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When asked about the case, Pope Francis was reported as saying “I can say that 
conscientious objection is a right that is a part of every human right… And if a 
person does not allow others to be a conscientious objector, he denies a right.”56 In 
April 2016, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant signed the Protecting Freedom of 
Conscience from Government Discrimination Act (or more formally House Bill 
1523). The Act was designed to “protect sincerely held religious beliefs and moral 
convictions of individuals, organizations and private association.” The law has been 
subject to legal action (Barber vs. Bryant). Congressional Republicans have proposed 
a Federal Version of this Act. 
There is not room here to examine in detail why and how the religious right has 
increasingly made legal claims to conscience, done so in relation to sexuality and often 
used human rights terms. The intense focus on sexuality itself seems relatively novel in 
theological terms (Williams 2010). The story of the Christian right’s turn to conscience 
also involves new cross-denominational coalitions, where particular Catholic and 
Protestant groups that might previously been in conflict – in Northern Ireland and 
elsewhere – have formed new strategic partnerships (Brown 2012; Greenhouse and 
Siegel 2012). It is also a story involving a shift from majoritarian attempts by Christian 
conservatives to enforce moral principles more widely, to a strategically defensive 
position that seeks to carve out spaces of exemption (McIvor 2016; NeJaime and Siegel 
2015). In this process, there are important - largely dialectical - links between the 
relative decline in interest in conscience by the human rights movement, and the 
increase in focus on the concept by the religious right.  The use of the language of 
“conscience” rather than “religion” is potentially significant, as it allows religious 
groups to forge new alliances, to claim a language of respectability, and to operate on a 
nominally secular base.  
Importantly though, the turn to conscience by the Christian right is not simply 
an example of an opportunistic manipulation of a malleable human rights category. 
And neither is it an inversion or distortion of the key meanings of conscience as a 
human rights term. Rather, human rights practices themselves have a history of 
reproducing distinct forms of exclusion (Perugini and Gordon 2016, 8). And as such, 
human rights attempts to protect conscience can therefore directly resonate with the 
exclusionary implications of the politics of the Christian right. The line between liberal 
and illiberal attempts to protect conscience is far from absolute. 
 
Conclusion 
In the middle of the twentieth century liberal cosmopolitan types – such as many 
human rights actors - routinely made claims of conscience in relation to questions of 
life and death, peace and war. Conscience was at the heart of the things that human 
rights activists wanted to protect. But, by the start of the twenty-first century, the 
human rights movement seems to have lost its enthusiasm for the term. If you 
mention freedom of conscience to many human rights activists they are likely to 
either look at you blankly, or mutter something about it being a slightly old fashioned 
term. In contrast, people of convinced conscience seem largely to be found amongst 
the religious right. But, it is not as if the liberal left has nothing left to worry its moral 
scruples. So why has there been a relative decline of interest in issues of conscience 
on the part of many human rights practitioners? And what difference does this make? 
The conscience of human rights has often sat uneasily alongside wider 
struggles for equality. Indeed, from the mid-twentieth century, if not before, the 
conscience of human right was often narrow and exclusionary, rather than universal 
and inclusive. Claims of conscience sough to protect a tightly circumscribed form of 
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conviction - one that was nonviolent, anti-authoritarian, and deeply individual - and 
found it difficult to respond to struggles over collective rights and equality that 
marked the latter decades of the twentieth century.  
But the increasing human rights discomfort with conscience is not simply a 
response to its exclusionary implications. Rather, it can also be seen as linked to a 
wider anxiety over all claims of conviction (Toscano 2010). Liberal politics – in 
which we can include much human rights - values convictions inasmuch as they stem 
from the moral will of autonomous individuals. But convictions are also mistrusted if 
they appear too fanatical, too fervent, or directed at the wrong sorts of goals. If 
conscience is associated with sincere and deep convictions, beliefs that are too 
strongly held can also seem suspect and irrational. At one level we value sincere 
commitments in general, but are also deeply cynical about anyone who claims to hold 
those commitments. At another level, the freedom of “freedom of conscience” 
implies the ability to choose. This is a situation described by Talal Asad where 
beliefs have to be held “so lightly that they can be changed” (2003, 115). To have a 
free conscience is to have the freedom to abandon that conscience. The freedom of 
“freedom of conscience” can therefore be seen as containing within it its own 
potential dissolution.  
Whilst conscience might well provide a source of moral energy for human 
rights work, it can also lead us into exclusionary and reactionary directions.  And any 
attempt to protect and valorize specific people because of their conscience ends up 
being arbitrary at best, and discriminatory at worst.  
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